This paper asks: What are the key structural barriers to fertility in advanced economies, and how might policy address them without coercion?

Birthrates aren’t falling, they’re being pushed down. According to a 2025 UNFPA survey, many people are having fewer children than they desire, with 20% of respondents explicitly stating they expect to have fewer children than they would like. Why? The reasons are complex: lack of support systems, unstable partnerships, delayed childbearing. But one factor stands out — economic constraint. In the same survey, 39% identified financial pressure as the primary barrier to having children (UNFPA, 2025).

This raises a question: are falling fertility rates truly the result of modern preferences and lifestyles, as often perceived? Or do individuals have little real choice in this significant, formative part of their life? 

This essay argues that falling fertility is not simply a matter of personal choice, but a systemic failure — economic, political, and environmental — that society must address at its roots.

The cost of accommodation appears to be a major reason why people are hesitant to have children. Housing prices have risen much faster than wages in most wealthy countries — in the last 50 years, house prices in Australia’s capital cities increased by 3,435%, while wage growth only increased by 1,183% (Money.com.au, 2024). 

Besides housing, the rise in unconventional work and labour market insecurity has discouraged or delayed many from having kids. Precarious work like gig jobs often means low wages, unpredictable hours, no benefits, and job insecurity — making parenthood a daunting financial risk. Data estimates that there are up to 435 million in gig work — a massive portion of the workforce is navigating unstable employment (World Bank, 2023). In effect, economic structures do not merely fail to support parents — they actively penalise them. And, even in traditional employment, structural disincentives remain.

The US is notably the only industrialised country without a national paid maternity leave policy. The FMLA provides 12 weeks of unpaid, protected leave. Only 12% of Americans receive paid parental leave, which drops to 5% for low-income households or those of colour (UNFPA, 2025). So, besides having to finance another human being, mothers have to give up a portion of their usual salary. Additionally, mothers face hiring and promotion biases, often perceived as less competent or committed (Júlia et al., 2024).

For many, the financial foundation they saw as a prerequisite for family life remains a distant ideal.

That is not to say that cultural changes have not played a role in the falling fertility rates. Changing identities and expectations have led to a prioritisation of individualism and self-actualisation, particularly in urban, high-education cohorts. Parenthood is no longer central to adult identity. There is a greater focus on being fulfilled, which may discourage childbearing — seeing how demanding taking care of a child is, in time and energy, leaving one with little time for themselves.

Another cause of lower fertility rates is a fear of the future. This fear could exist for a plethora of reasons, including climate change, economic pessimism, and political instability.

In many cases, the decision to delay or forgo children reflects not selfishness, but fear — a fear that the world is no longer safe or stable enough to raise a child in. Climate anxiety has become a major deterrent to childbearing. A 2023 PLOS Climate review found that across 12 of 13 studies, stronger climate concerns correlated with lower fertility intentions (Dillarstone et al., 2023). A 2025 European study found a 10% rise in climate anxiety linked to a 7.3% birthrate drop (Breton, 2025).

Similarly, economic pessimism can cast a shadow over the prospect of having a child. A 2024 study found that people who were more pessimistic about society were less likely to have children, even when their income satisfaction and depression levels were controlled for (Ivanova & Balbo, 2024). 

Research has shown that fertility rates decline by up to one-third during periods of political instability or civil unrest, with recovery occurring once conditions stabilise (PRB, 2019). This suggests that perceived uncertainty can decisively impact reproductive choices.

Ultimately, concern for the conditions into which a child would be born has been constraining fertility decisions in advanced economies. While cultural shifts toward individualism do play a role, it is the structural pressures — economic, environmental, and political — that most often turn hesitation into surrender. Crucially, those are the ones we may still be able to change. 

Before addressing potential solutions, it is worth considering whether low fertility is inherently a problem. Is it necessary to implement measures to increase fertility rates? Is lower reproduction certainly detrimental? Although the drawbacks are more publicised, lower fertility has potential benefits too.

Fewer people use up fewer resources. Smaller families allow greater investment per child, often improving outcomes and raising overall human capital. Moreover, in the short term, a decline in the dependency ratio could raise GDP per capita, and the savings ratio. Extra savings could be used to fuel investment, boosting economic growth. 

However, it’s worth noting that a low fertility rate could lead to an ageing population in the long term, increasing public spending on pensions and healthcare. China offers a striking case study — its rapidly aging population, a direct consequence of decades of low fertility due to the nation’s one-child policy, is exerting massive pressure on its economy. China’s over-65 population hit 12% in 2021 and is projected to reach 26% by 2050 (Lobanov-Rostovsky et al., 2023). The dependency ratio reached 22.5% in 2023, i.e, for every 100 working-age people, there are 22.5 elderly dependents (CGTN, 2024). This demographic shift leads to higher healthcare costs; for instance, Beijing’s healthcare expenditure per capita for the elderly aged 65 and above is 7.25 times that for those under 25 (He & Bian, 2024). The country is urgently promoting the development of private pension systems to try and alleviate some of this growing burden on state funds, a hint at the fiscal strain China is experiencing (Gov.cn, 2024).

Other consequences are apparent too. There will be fewer working-age individuals to fill jobs — a labour shortage may reduce productivity and innovation. Further, fertility decline can fuel existential anxieties over national survival, as seen in Japan, where the low birth rate has been described by the prime minister as an “urgent risk to society” (BBC News, 2023).

Perhaps, to come up with a solution, a distinction needs to be made. Is the solution to raise fertility rates, or simply to mitigate the consequences? Some propose AI as a labour substitute — but current limitations in emotional intelligence and human care make this solution premature.

We should review the causes of low fertility. Instead of forcing people to reproduce, the obstacles that deter them from having children should be removed. As such, solving the fertility crisis is not just demographic policy—it is economic justice, climate stability, and social dignity. Not only would this increase the population growth, it will also increase the overall quality of life and happiness — which has been linked to greater productivity (University of Oxford, 2019).

Many individuals want children but do not have them; society is not structured to help them do so. Policies should aim to align personal hopes with actual capability; reproductive agency should not be restored through pressurising incentives like subsidies, but by ensuring that choosing to have a child is no longer an act of risk.

No single policy can solve low fertility; rather, it requires a society where housing is attainable, the climate is stable, and the future feels possible. When fertility rates fall not by choice, but a lack-of, the answer is not persuasion. It’s liberation.

Works cited:

BBC News. (2023, January 23). Japan PM warns country is on brink over falling birth rate. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-64373950

Breton, M. (2025, March 13). Hotter climate, frozen fertility? A conversation with Marion Breton. European University Institute. https://www.eui.eu/news-hub?id=hotter-climate-frozen-fertility-a-conversation-with-marion-breton

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